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This article investigates online profiling and data strategies by identifying and com-
paring data strategies of the two most visited internet companies, Google and Face-
book. The aim of the article is to use media economics and management perspectives 
to enrich the discussion on profiling from a political economy perspective. The article 
maps differences in the data strategies of the services and the potential data col-
lected through a data point analysis, and suggests conceptual distinctions between 
vertical and horizontal data strategies, touch point and social network, integrated 
and diversified application programming interface (API) structures, and relevance 
and reputation data strategy perspectives. Furthermore, the findings in the article 
suggest distinguishing among profiling for advertisers, developers, and government 
agencies. Addressing these stakeholders through the identified data strategic differ-
ences, the findings point to different implications for privacy, digital divides, algorith-
mic adoption, and societal segregation and intolerance. 
Introduction
One of the current most lucrative economic models of large internet services is targeted 
commercial information through profiling of the target group or individual. In 2012, 83% 
of Facebook’s income came from advertising and an estimated 96% of Google’s income 
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came from advertising in 2011 (Ebersman, 2012; Kelly, 2012). As addressed by other scholars 
(Castells & Arsenault, 2009; Van Couvering, 2003; Mansell, 2004), the internet has an oli-
gopolistic market structure in which ownership and power (of advertising) is in the hands 
of a few companies. In 2010, Google had 71.27% of the search market and Facebook had 
60.7% of the total social media market (Anderson, 2012). In Denmark for instance, 18.3% 
of total internet time is spent on Facebook and 15.2% on Google searches (Thunø, 2013). 
These internet companies compete for advertising money by being able to create a lucra-
tive advertising environment through precise targeting.
In order for advertising agencies to target the relevant groups and individuals, internet 
companies need both a palette of products that generates relevant data and data mining 
techniques that are able to scrutinize large data sets and single out relevant profiles through 
more-or-less advanced pattern recognition. This type of dossier is a digital footprint or 
“’signature’ that can be found in the ocean of transactional data created in the course of 
everyday life” (Dempsey & Flint, 2004, p. 1464). On the basis of these data, internet services 
can track and document activities and develop comprehensive profiles based on certain 
demographics, purchases, social interactions, interests, locations, and clickstream patterns 
(Rubinstein, Lee, & Schwartz, 2008). 
To obtain these valuable data, users often receive messages from Google and Facebook 
that allow the companies to collect data on their whereabouts or asking them to allow the 
companies to cross-reference data from different devices and different services in the name 
of user convenience. These end-users are users of cloud computing; seamlessly switching 
between digital devices such as smartphones, laptops, tablets, and services such as games, 
social networks, searches, video streaming, and clothing and grocery stores. 
Giving away data online has especially been seen as an act of convenience at the cost of 
security in what has been called the “the dancing pigs” phenomena (McGraw & Felton, 1999) 
or the “privacy paradox” (Barnes, 2006); users do worry about security and privacy, but not 
enough to compromise convenience. With social media, the increasing amount of data that 
is freely shared has been analyzed as an aspect of user impression management (eg. Boyd, 
2007), where the data shared play a central role in the image of a person, for the self por-
traits of who we are. In this interpretation, we are therefore freely participating in a “surveil-
lance” (Albrechtslund, 2008) that we can benefit from socially. Functionally, the registration 
of, for instance, location can give access to information on what or who is near the user when 
moving around, along with tips and ideas from users on what to read, watch, buy, or like. 
From a commercial point of view, freely accessible data about users are a valuable com-
modity because they make (predictive) behavioral targeting (Dwyer, 2009) more precise in 
terms of interest in a specific product category, proximity to a physical store, or other indi-
cators of whether a certain product would be interesting and therefore more likely to sell 
to a certain user. Furthermore, in cloud services the integration of data from different user 
modes, such as, searches, social networking, or mail, makes it possible to mine complex 





The strategy of personalized targeting through data mining can be treated as a schism 
between providing relevant information to users and the usage of data for commercial 
purpose; or as phrased by Millar, the internet companies have an interest in the best match 
between “the predictive profiling and the ‘individual’s underlying psychological properties’” 
(2009, p. 114). Hence arises the growing awareness of privacy that has characterized both 
the public debate and internet research recently (Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Capurro, 2005; 
Fernback & Papacharissi, 2007; Albrechtslund, 2008; Ess, 2009; Boyd & Hargittai, 2010). 
The academic literature on internet profiling and privacy has strong roots in surveillance 
research (e.g., Foucault, 1995; Lyon, 2001) and political economy (e.g., Marx in Fuchs, 2011; 
Fernback & Papacharissi, 2007). Both fields of research address the uneven power relation 
between the superior commercial company or state agency and the repressed user. On the 
other hand, we have a growing literature that tries to analyze empirically how users behave 
in this economy and not least how researchers methodologically use application program-
ming interfaces (API) to document such online behavior (e.g., Neuhaus & Webmoor, 2012). 
The aim of this article is not to conduct a user study on profiling, but rather to detail and 
enrich the discussion on profiling in the political economy field (Wasko, Murdock, & Sousa, 
2011) through a media economics and management perspective, by analyzing the differ-
ences in data strategies and the implications of profiling for different types of stakeholders. 
By doing so, the article hopefully will contribute to comparative studies of data strategies 
as an emerging and necessary research topic. The key contributions of the article are the 
development of preliminary, grounded, and comparative data strategy concepts and the 
attempt to broaden the political economy discussions through media economics. 
Theory and concepts: Internet profiling in communication studies
Political economy is preoccupied by the “structural” as well as “processual” power rela-
tions in society (Mansell, 2004, p. 97) and is often considered to be critical, normative, 
and macro-level based in contrast to the more micro-level descriptive media economics. 
Instead of accepting the status quo, political economy scholars often challenge the unjust 
and inequalities (Wasko, Murdock, & Sousa, 2011, p. 3). However, this article will use the 
media economics’ descriptive and grounded micro-level approach as a way to inform fur-
ther work on profiling within a political economy perspective. More precisely, the article is 
inspired by a theoretical understanding of economy based on the mapping of ownership 
structures in media industries as executed by, for instance, communication scholars Cas-
tells and Arsenault (Castells & Arsenault, 2008; Castells, 2009) and will use this approach 
to identify possible data gathered through acquiring and developing different features and 
services to profile users. Furthermore, the article will use Mintzberg’s five focus areas in 
strategic analysis (pattern, position, perspective, plan, and ploy) to sum up the differences 





In this article, internet profiling as a concept is defined as the ability of an organization 
or company to create an understanding of a person on the basis of personal information 
or data points (Neuhaus & Weboor, 2012) gathered by data companies through specific 
data strategies (e.g., behavior, attitudes, and motives, and potential behavior and interests). 
Profiling and personalization are not synonyms in this article. Typically, profiling is used as 
personalization in third party apps or advertisements, but can also be used to single out 
individuals in risk assessments by government agencies or the financial industry. 
The concept of intraoperability (Sutor, 2011) has been adapted here to characterize the 
uneven power relation in the data economy. Interoperability is defined as the way in which 
services and databases are able to “talk” to one another and share data across domains 
and platforms through the programming interface. Sutor criticizes the use of the term 
“interoperability” for not taking into consideration the intent of opening up the code. He 
argues that we need to distinguish between actual interoperability, where parties connect 
in symmetrical power relations, and intraoperability, where software providers are domi-
nant in terms of market share, attitude, or acquiescence, and want to “suck all-important 
data and processing into the central software ecosystem” (Sutor 2011, p. 214). In the case 
of Facebook and Google, we see intraoperability. Developers agree upon an asymmetri-
cal power relationship where they connect to Facebook and Google, thereby enhancing 
the importance of their standards, making them more powerful as data hubs and passage 
points (Castells, 2009; Latour, 1987; Bechmann, 2009). Following this argument, it is the 
description of the differences in these data intraoperability strategies that is the focal point 
of this article, and who the stakeholders are in this intraoperable data economy.
Profiling, data exchange, and predictive behavioral targeting are hot topics in contem-
porary internet research, and the literature addresses different stakeholders dependent on 
the research field and perspective. Often, profiling is studied from a privacy policy perspec-
tive (e.g., Stutzman, Gross, & Acquisti, 2012; Nissenbaum, 2010; Bodle, 2011a), exemplifying 
certain privacy issues with selected cases of extreme profiling; not as a data infrastructure 
and data strategy analysis as this article is aiming to conduct. However, this body of lit-
erature addresses the relationships among data companies, users, advertisers, and govern-
ment agencies (e.g., Dempsey & Flint, 2004; Solove, 2008). Other profiling studies are either 
qualitative user studies of personal data usages (e.g., Taddicken, 2012; Marwick & boyd, 
2011; Bechmann, 2013b) or predictive behavior studies of, for instance, social media users 
(e.g., Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013; Jernigan & Mistree, 2009). These studies do not 
focus on data flow structure and profiling as economy, but on optimization and evaluation 
of profiling or on profiling as sense-making (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2013). This literature 
places an emphasis on the relationships among the data company in question, the users, 
and in some cases advertisements as instances of communication. However, a growing lit-
erature on application programming interfaces (APIs) as tools for data retrieval introduces 
a new stakeholder of user profiling: developers and third party companies (e.g., Neuhaus & 





Thus, three stakeholders can be identified in the economy of data intraoperability apart 
from the data companies and the users themselves: 
1. Advertisers
2. Third party companies (developers)
3. Government agencies 
The article will consider these three stakeholders in order to discuss profiling and the econ-
omy of data intraoperability. 
Even though existing studies have not compared data strategies of Google and Face-
book, this article will build on knowledge gained via several studies on different aspects 
of Google’s and Facebook’s data strategies. These strategies are thoroughly discussed in 
non-academic literature about Facebook and Google, but with a focus on the profile of the 
companies (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2010; Vise & Malseed, 2005; Battelle, 2005). Roosendaal (2012) 
and Gerlitz and Helmond (2013) focus on the economy of Facebook’s “like” and the data 
flows affiliated with these plugins used by external websites. These plugins are developed 
to increase the amount of data on usage patterns for Facebook on third party websites. 
Gerlitz and Helmond show how Google Analytics is by far the most widely used tracker 
based on the top 100 global websites (according to Alexa.com) and that 18% of the web-
sites have installed Facebook social plugins or Facebook connect. Both plugins are tracking 
tools for developers in order to integrate their websites with Google and Facebook (often 
as an authentication procedure or Facebook like-button). This article will build on the find-
ings of Gerlitz and Helmond and expand and update their findings in order to generalize 
to the data strategy of Google and Facebook. Supplementing Gerlitz and Helmond, Bodle 
(2011b), Stutzman, Gross, and Acquisti (2012) and Raynes-Goldie (2012) outline the history 
of data collection, tracking, and interoperability, with a focus on privacy issues. This article 
will draw on these mappings as part of the comparison of data strategies of Facebook and 
Google. Similar works on Google are primarily found in the critical literature on Google as 
a monopolistic filter bubble (e.g., Elgesam, 2008; Halavais, 2010; Fuchs, 2011). This litera-
ture will provide insight into the structure of Google Search, but when it comes to data 
economy, it is important to take into consideration that Google owns other services apart 
from Search that enable them to collect data across domains.
Methodology: Data point analysis 
This article focuses on analyzing the data strategies of the top two internet services in the 
world, Facebook and Google (alexa.com, April 2013), in order to outline and compare their 
data economies. Turning to Neuhaus and Webmoor’s concept of data points as instances 
of “personal information used in a digital context” (2012, p. 46), the differences in data 





tions: How do the companies gather different data points about users? What does that say 
about their overall strategies? And how do the strategies affect profiling?
Methodologically, the article will use a “follow the medium” (Rogers, 2013) inspired 
approach in which the different possible data points of the companies are mapped through 
a descriptive outline of their product portfolio and how they add to profiling. In order to 
qualify the case descriptions, the article will build on triangulation of analytical sources: the 
above outlined existing literature, supplemented with API structure analysis, and online 
information from and about the companies. As the article will show, there are important 
differences in their data strategies. Besides the limitations to outlining data flows through 
APIs (e.g., Bechmann & Lomborg, forthcoming), the knowledge of the API structure is more 
profound in Facebook than Google in the following sections. Facebook has one shared API 
in contrast to Google’s many different APIs for each service. Also, the size of the Google 
product portfolio has led to a more selective and exemplifying description than in the 
case of Facebook. Due to the economic value of data algorithms and the earlier mentioned 
schismatic relationship between convenience and exploitation, both Google and Facebook 
are black boxes to researchers, as the companies have no interest in revealing what kind of 
data they have on users and exactly how they retrieved it. This often gives the research con-
tributions on this topic a somewhat speculative nature, because we are not able to make 
in-depth tests of the actual algorithms and data strategies (e.g., Bucher, 2012); we can only 
move towards an understanding of the potential profiling principles. However, strategic 
pattern analysis is always produced from the outside and in retrospect (Mintzberg, 1987). 
The result is that the data strategic pattern analysis and the mapping of potential profiling 
are made from a company-centered public perspective.
In the next two sections, the cases of Google and Facebook will be presented in terms 
of product portfolio, advertising interface, and API structure, and how they potentially add 
to profiling. Due to methodological limitations, the outline cannot be exhaustive, but it 
will highlight the most important services and products developed, acquired, or achieved 
through collaborations. Afterwards, the article will summarize the differences in data strat-
egies and discuss the implication for advertisers, third party companies, and government 
agencies. The data strategy concepts developed are grounded in the cases, but steered by 
the theoretical framing and identified stakeholders.
Google
Google was founded in 1998 as a search engine that would rank search results according 
to estimated relevance and importance with the algorithm PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998; 
Vise & Malseed, 2005; Battelle, 2005). In 2000, Google started to use advertisements on 
their search engine, connected to search keywords through Adwords. The data points that 





ing, topics, placements on, for instance, specific external websites, search or display ads, 
keywords, device, and connection. 
Illustration 1: Examples of metrics from Google Adwords.
Google registers the clickstream pattern and search terms of users when using Google 
Search. Furthermore, the personal ad profile becomes finer grained with Google’s contex-
tual targeting services. Among others, AdSense registers advertising categories (released 
in 2003) when clicking on Google advertisements on external webpages, DoubleClick 
(acquired in 2008) registers ad interactions and page views on primarily display ads, and 
Google Analytics (released 2005) registers on-site behavior across digital media platforms. 
The acquisition of Teracent (in 2009) makes Google able to tailor ads instantly according to 
the tracking results and the acquisition of Admobs (2010) strengthens Google’s ad market 
on mobile platforms (Skou, 2010). 
These advertising strategies mirror their product strategies. In 2000, Google began a 
new distributed strategy of search. Instead of forcing users to visit their site, they make a 
plug-in so that users can search from other websites. The buying and releasing of new kinds 
of services in 2002 and onwards under the Google brand follow this diversification strategy. 
In 2004, Google acquired Keyhole and Where 2 Technologies, digital mapping companies, 





this technology. Today it is possible to integrate with, for instance, Google Maps through 
API so that other web services can make different mash-ups. Google Maps has become 
the most used mapping service for location based social networks and other smartphone 
geo-services. 
In 2004, Google released a beta version of their ad-based online email client Gmail that 
allows the user to keep all their mails in the cloud of Google, and in 2005, Gmail became 
available for mobile platforms along with many other Google services. IGoogle (released 
in 2007, terminated in 2013) was a personal tailored web portal that helped users keep an 
overview of the (potentially) many Google services through single sign-on. This integration 
later became a standard setting of the Google services, tying them closer together both 
visually and legally.
In 2005, Google also released YouTube and acquired the location-based social network-
ing service Dodgeball (founded 2000) and in 2009 opened a similar service called Google 
Latitude. Google Latitude locates the user on different platforms through IP address (PC), 
GPS, or Cellular Positioning (mobile platforms). It is possible through layers to integrate 
the geographical positions of your network with, e.g., geo-tagged status updates from 
Google+ (replacing Buzz released in 2010). In 2005, Google also bought the Linux-based 
operating system Android. From a data strategic perspective, this was an important move, 
as Google then could collect data from the smartphone that was formerly unavailable to 
the company. This data strategy is a continuation of the diversification strategy of Google 
that started with Google Search and other web application, spread to websites (through 
Google Analytics, DoubleClick, and AdWords), browser (Chrome), and desktop, and then 
to operating system and last but not least hardware. With the hardware data strategy, 
Google is able to collect data directly from a device like Apple that gives renewed data 
points to the pool. This strategy is executed in collaboration with hardware companies 
such as Sony (Google TV released in 2010), Asus, LG, Samsung (different Nexus smart-
phone versions), Acer (Chromebook), and Toyota (Google driverless car). As of March 2012, 
Google introduced one privacy policy to all their services, which allowed them to profile 
from data points across services, treating the user as “single users” (Reitman, 2012), and in 
2013, Google released beta versions of Google Glass to selected developers. Google Glass 
again adds new data points as wearable computing, not only as a mobile device, but as an 
accessory that has the potential to generate data on eye-tracking technology. This adds 
new dimensions to profiling in terms of potential data points, such as unconscious user 
eye-movements. 
As of 2013, Google has over 100 different services ranging from web and mobile stand-
alone application to desktop applications, operating systems, and hardware. As a devel-
oper, this horizontal data strategy can be integrated through different APIs that make 
fine-grained profiling for them more difficult than if they were to just access one API with 





Google Analytics Data Export API Google Apps APIs
Google Base Data API Blogger Data API
Google Booksearch Data API Google Calendar Data API
Google Code Search Data API Google Contacts Data API
Google Documents List Data API Google Finance Portfolio Data API
Google Health Data API Google Maps Data API
Picasa Web Albums Data API Google Project Hosting Issue Tracker API
Google Sidewiki Data API Google Sites Data API
Google Spreadsheets Data API Google Translator Toolkit Data API
Google Webmaster Tools Data API YouTube Data API
Illustration 2: As of 2013, Google has 20 different APIs for developers to integrate with, to 
obtain different data points in user profiling (https://developers.google.com/gdata/docs/
directory).
As an Internet user it is difficult not to come across some of Google’s services because of 
their expansive strategy and the heavy impact of especially Google Search and Youtube. 
As this short and non-exhaustive overview of Google’s services shows, the functions avail-
able are innumerable, but the functions run fairly single standing with little advanced data 
cross-reference despite the integrated privacy policy. 
Facebook 
At first glance, the products of Facebook are much less complex than Google’s, because 
Facebook “only” offers social networking. Google has a diversification strategy with acqui-
sitions of different services on the internet, for instance, video streaming service Youtube, 
online work facilities (Drive), Gmail, and Android. In comparison to Google’s strategy, Face-
book integrates services into the same framework when collecting data on its users. Even 
so Facebook like Google also builds on the strategy of acquiring companies in order to 
obtain the relevant user functions to generate detailed usage data, and relies heavily on 
collaboration with strong partners, which will be the focus in this section.
Facebook was released in 2004 as a social media that encouraged university students 
to network with existing circles of friends through a profile page called “the wall” (like the 
university facebook) and user created groups and events (for its early development see, 
for instance, Kirkpatrick, 2010; Raynes-Goldie, 2012). In 2005 Facebook added the popular 
photo album feature that allowed users to tag friends on photos and thereby connect a 
new data point to another user’s profile (Raynes-Goldie, 2012). In 2006 the public version of 
Facebook became available to everyone, including companies, and Facebook expanded its 
data collecting strategy by introducing new functionalities such as status updates, News-





2013; Bucher, 2012). In 2007 Facebook made an advertising alliance with Microsoft, which 
became “the exclusive third-party advertising partner for Facebook” and after the alliance 
owned 1.3% of the shares (Raynes-Goldie, 2012; Microsoft, 2007). The same year Facebook 
made an aggressive move in its data strategy with the introduction of especially Facebook 
for iphone, Pages, Facebook Platform, and later Facebook Ads and Pages (Raynes-Goldie, 
2012; Bodle, 2011b). 
From a data strategic perspective, Facebook Platform was of particular importance, as 
this initiative expanded the Facebook data network into thousands of external sites col-
lecting usage patterns outside the domain of Facebook (Kharif, 2007; Bodle, 2011b). Build-
ing on a beta version from 2006, Facebook Platform consisted of integration with ten data 
points: Canvas, profile box, profile action, News feed, Mini-feed, left navigation, Request, 
Notifications, emails, messages, and share (Facebook, 2007). Today the ten integrative data 
points have grown to an incredible number of data points that can be integrated in differ-
ent solutions through the Facebook Graph API; as Facebook Apps, such as FarmVille, Pet 
Society, Facebook Quizzes, and myBirthdayCalender; as Facebook Connect (2008), which 
lets external websites use Facebook login data as authentication and at the same time 
transport activity data back to Facebook; as plugins (Roosendaal, 2012) on external web-
sites, such as, like-buttons or instant personalization (2010); or as external mobile apps on 
Android or IOS, using live data from Facebook in return for sending activity data back to 
Facebook (Bodle, 2011b).
Achievement (Instance) Album Application
Check in Comment Domain





Post Privacy Parameter Publishing
Question Question Option Real-time Updates
Review Search Selecting Results
Status message Thread User
Video
Illustration 3: Facebook has 34 objects available for integration as of April 2013. Every object 
has subcategories of data that can be used to integrate with. For instance, the object User 






Using the valuable extensive data collection, Facebook began to generate positive “cash-
flow” in 2009 (Carlson, 2009). Since then Facebook has acquired important companies, 
such as, the social networking aggregator FriendFeed (2009), the friend finder service Octa-
zen (2010), Friendster patents (2010), the check-in service Hot Potato (2010), the location 
based service Gowalla (2011), the photo sharing service Instagram (2012), and the face rec-
ognition platform Face.com (2012). Apart from Instagram, all services and teams have been 
used to build and strengthen features on Facebook, such as Facebook Places (2010). 
In 2012 Facebook was registered on NasDaq and recently the company has added fea-
tures that go in direct competition with, for instance, Google. In 2012 Facebook released 
App Center, an equivalent to App Store (Apple), with apps that connect to Facebook (Scott, 
2012). In 2013 Facebook released the Graph Search feature in collaboration with Microsoft 
Bing, which was an attempt to create a social search engine that allows users to search on 
specific queries involving the activities and likes of friends. This is an important feature 
from a data strategic perspective as it adds behavior that before was primarily reserved 
to the Google domain. Another aggressive data strategy in 2013 was the introduction of 
Facebook Home as an integrated feature to HTC smartphones (Svensson, 2013). Facebook 
Home is integrated in the operating system and thus has access to collect smartphone data 
that has otherwise been off-limits for Facebook (e.g., geo-location data). 
Even though all these data points, which have voluntarily been provided by users or col-
lected “behind the scenes” by Facebook, give an extremely accurate profile of the end-user 
(e.g., Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013), the profiling for advertising purposes is still limited. 
At the time of writing, it is only possible to profile on specific metrics: Zip code, gender, 
age, interests, connection, users (or friends of users) of specific pages, apps or events, rela-
tionship status, interested in, education, graduation year, and workplace. Furthermore, the 
advertiser can choose to show the activity of the user’s friend related to the product (e.g., 
likes or shares).
Facebook has the potential to make fine-grained profiling with the increased amount 
of data points collected, but it is not at the time of writing reflected in the advertising 
choices. Compared to for instance Gmail or Facebook Apps, it is not possible to make con-
text (semantic) sensitive advertisements yet despite the before mentioned dual intention 
to make profiling ads more relevant to users who in turn are more likely to engage with the 
advertised content.
Findings: Differences in data strategies
The analysis of data points collected through the features and services of Google and Face-
book reveals both similarities and differences. Both Facebook and Google have the ambi-
tion of becoming data companies that generate different data points across a variety of 
features and not least external websites. Through tracking services such as Google analyt-





and Google collect data in an intraoperable way. Also both companies have expanded their 
data strategies to the operating system level to increase their territory for data collection 
and they have acquired and collaborated with companies in order to optimize their data 
collecting features and services. However, inspired by Mintzberg’s general strategic catego-
ries (1987) and based on the case descriptions, significant differences in data strategies can 
be mapped and outlined as well: 
Data Strategy Google Facebook
Strategic pattern Horizontal data strategy Vertical data strategy
Position (inter- vs. 
intraoperability)
Market leader in Search 
(intraoperability)
Market leader in social media 
(intraoperability)
Perspective Relevance Reputation
Plan & Ploy Acquiring mostly services and patents, 
integrated API, focusing on touch points
Acquiring mostly features and pat-
ents, diversified API, focusing on social 
networks
Table 1. Differences in data strategies
To summarize the main difference, the terminology horizontal (Google) and vertical data 
strategies (Facebook) are used. Google has a much more aggressive approach when it comes 
to diversified data points. Google focuses on different usage situations such as work (Drive, 
Illustration 4: Examples of the metrics that advertisers can use to target their products on 





Calendar), socializing (Google+), and video watching (YouTube & Google TV). In contrast 
to Facebook, this makes Google capable of collecting data points across a user’s everyday 
doings thereby offering a more complex set of digital footprints, if Google manages to keep 
the user locked into its portfolio and touch points. Facebook on the other hand collects 
data points related to socializing as the overarching topic of the data points and collabo-
rates with especially Microsoft to deliver data from other products (e.g., integrating with 
Bing Search and Bing Map). One could argue that this is a weak data point strategy, but the 
strategy can be strong if they are able to expand the use of the Facebook platform for dif-
ferent purposes and thereby generate data from a variety of everyday usage situations (e.g., 
through the use of Facebook Connect and Social Graph integration). Secondly, Google 
also includes hardware solutions in its product portfolio and possible data point collec-
tions such as Google driverless car, Google Glass, Chromebook, and different versions of 
Nexus. In comparison, Facebook only integrates with the operating system of some smart-
phones through Facebook Home. This again adds to Google’s diversified data points, but it 
also makes the company weaker in terms of the anti-trust claims that affected particularly 
Microsoft and Apple. It has a decisive effect on the data points collected and the type of 
profiling available to advertisers, developers, and government agencies. A horizontal data 
strategy allows for user profiling and targeting according to user needs throughout a daily 
routine and daily touch points, whereas a vertical data strategy allows for profiling and 
targeting according to specific needs and routines. At the same time, Facebook breaks this 
strategy as an ideal-type by using intraoperable solutions and incorporates user behavior 
from external touch points as well (Facebook connect, social graph).
Secondly, another important difference is in terms of the strategic positions of Google 
and Facebook. Whereas Google is market leader in Search, Facebook is market leader in 
social media. This provides an important legal difference in Facebook’s closed and Google’s 
semi-closed product portfolio. Facebook demands user authentication in order to give 
access to Facebook features. On the other hand, Google mixes public non-authenticated 
services such as Search and Map with services that demand authentication (Gmail, Hang-
out, and Google+). Despite the shared privacy policy on all services, this means that it is 
difficult to use the data points across services in order to make and sell the valuable profil-
ing; the data points simply become less valuable because they cannot be cross-correlated. 
Given the fact that the public Search still drives Google’s revenue, the traffic and data 
gathered here is still isolated legally for mining with closed services such as Gmail, because 
informed consent has not been collected.
Thirdly, Google and Facebook have different strategic perspectives. Whereas Google 
has made “Relevancy” the corporate brand and overall strategic benchmark, Facebook 
focuses on social connections and reputation. In terms of data points, Facebook thereby 
has a social bias compared to Google’s functional one. 
Fourthly, the difference in API structures sketched out in the cases, with Google having 





strategic plan of collecting data points in product silos for Google and as a data pool for 
Facebook. Facebook creates features to monitor user actions in networks whereas Google 
creates services to monitor user actions in functional touch points. 
In the last section, the data strategic analysis will be used as a stepping stone to discuss 
the societal implications for the identified stakeholders in a political economy perspective.
Discussion: Profiling for different stakeholders
In a political economy perspective intraoperability as data phenomena pose a threat and 
risk to our society, because personal data are stored in few services that are owned and 
controlled by commercial interests. This means that regardless of motives everyone who is 
able to pay for it can access a large amount of the total end-user online footprints through 
few services (APIs). This uneven power relationship among subordinate users and third 
party companies and superior data companies calls for detailed discussion. As the analysis 
shows, differences occur in the data strategy of different intraoperable services and may 
lead to different societal implications in terms of profiling.
Profiling for advertisers
In terms of advertising, profiling equals personalized ads based on a predictive behav-
ioral targeting as a result of fine-grained segmentation (Dwyer, 2009). This fine-grained 
segmentation is not only based on demographics, but also as shown regarding behavior 
and participation patterns, and differs in the Facebook and Google cases. Google validates 
“relevance” of the ad to users through Quality Score, Facebook seems more concerned 
with the reputation of the account (Carswell, 2011). The horizontal data strategy provides 
advertisers with easier access to the everyday rhythms and doings of an individual if the 
person uses the entire Google product portfolio and provides advertisers the opportunity 
to track users very precisely in the desirable touch point. On the other hand, Facebook’s 
vertical data strategy provides advertisers with a strong and unique knowledge of the social 
interaction and network of friends that potentially can enhance brand value and reputa-
tion and furthermore strengthen the buying incentives due to social referral. 
However, from a political economy perspective, the horizontal data strategy poses 
challenges to transparency, because users deliver more data points than intended; either 
because they forget the vast amount of services used with one company or because they 
are unfamiliar with the complex network of tracking and monitoring facilities, spanning 
from censors to digital footprints left behind, when interacting with the services and usage 
of these data (Tavani, 1999). In different ways Facebook provides the same “creep factor” 
(Turow, 2013). Facebook users have collected a massive amount of personal likes, shares, 
messages, and photos, and tagged the data into an identifiable personal network of friends 
and acquaintances. Even though limited to one service, the participation is so excessive 





the connections they make when interacting. It is therefore impossible to control the 
targeting once the user starts using Facebook as a service, because the user is exposed 
through friends. In both cases, the predictive behavioral (and semantic) targeting may pose 
implications to society in terms of both social cohesion and privacy. Social segregation is 
made through price targeting and segmented product delivery according to those who 
are willing and able to pay and those who are not, or those who are interesting (brand-
wise) customers or not. In the case of Facebook, privacy is disturbed when a user’s name is 
used in ads because a friend liked a product on Facebook. In the non-personalized settings 
such as Google Search, privacy can be invaded when personalized ads are shared with the 
wrong individual. This was the case when a father found out that his daughter was preg-
nant through ads from Target (Duhigg, 2012). This case suggests that future studies on 
advertising and profiling not only should focus on the data companies, but on the available 
data points and possible data mining across intraoperable data companies.
Profiling for developers and companies
In the discussion on profiling for third party companies (developers), personalization is often 
the goal. For instance when companies use Google or Facebook’s data APIs to customize 
apps (Bodle, 2011b). Whereas the horizontal service strategy of Google provides developers 
with silo access to service integration in which developers still mainly engage with products 
(e.g., Maps), Facebook’s vertical strategy and integrated API structure provide developers 
with a more profound possibility for personal customization. This personalization cannot 
take place without the informed consent of users, but statistics and qualitative studies 
show that users do not read the agreements and therefore do not actually consent (e.g., 
Bechmann, 2013a). Informed consent as click-wrap agreements therefore becomes a legal 
paradox that needs to be handled for instance by removing informed consent possibilities 
from the regulation on privacy altogether.
However, profiling for third party companies is even more important when it occurs 
as selection or de-selection in the name of risk assessment and management. Again it is 
difficult to retrieve behavioral patterns from Google’s diversified API infrastructure, but 
straightforward with Facebook’s integrated API. Social media intraoperable data hubs such 
as Facebook provide companies with background data that can be utilized to predict risk, 
for instance, in hiring, insurance pricing, and bank loans (Quittner, 2012). Predicting risk 
from our networks of friends and our everyday participation may again threaten the cohe-
sion of society and lead to unwanted social segregation. Furthermore, risk assessment cre-
ates an ethical paradox in which users are unaware of the assessment and therefore do not 
have the ability to act accordingly or adapt to the rules and values of the algorithms, and 
if this knowledge is obtained, the data value in risk assessment profiling will be decreased. 
If only some users obtain knowledge of this kind of predictive data mining, there will be 





Profiling for government agencies
Despite no immediate financial gain for data companies, government agencies can legally 
gain access to data from the intraoperable data companies in the name of national security 
and, at the time of writing, Prism by NSA is an example of an initiative that tries to make 
predictive profiling to fight terrorism and other national threats. As government agencies 
access raw log-data across data companies, differences in product portfolios become more 
important than differences in strategy. Potentially, in the case of Facebook and Google, 
government agencies circumvent APIs and they will get access to both vertical depth and 
the horizontal breadth. In other words, through clickstreams and user networking, partici-
pation, and data sharing, they are in theory able to analyze the whole spectrum of interac-
tions. Profiling in this case is not a question of personalization, but again a matter of risk 
assessment and selection of potential dangerous or criminal individuals (Dempsey & Flint, 
2004). Every user of the internet becomes a suspect compared to earlier methods, where 
only prior convicted individuals were screened for crimes that had already taken place 
(Rubenstein, Lee, & Schwartz, 2008). From a political economy perspective, such methods 
build on the idea that terrorist planning creates data patterns and crime can be predicted 
on the basis of standardized data behavior and, for instance, semantic values. As Solove 
(2008) writes: “data mining programs are often not visible to the public to quell much fear. 
Instead, their benefits come primarily from their actual effectiveness in reducing terrorist 
threats, which remains highly speculative.” (p. 352) If the Prism algorithm had a maximum 
value of three mentions of bombing on our Facebook, Youtube, and Gmail accounts before 
we would be registered as a suspect and denied entry in the U.S., we would adjust our 
actions accordingly, without knowing if the algorithm proved effective in actually catch-
ing terrorists. Apart from compromising freedom of expression, algorithms as government 
methods highlight deviant behavior as something noticeable and bad. Minorities stand 
out immediately (Jernigan & Mistree, 2009) and algorithms leave little room for contextual 
sensitivity (Nissenbaum, 2010), which would take into account the individual in the system. 
The filter bubble has far bigger societal reach than in the critique of Google Search (Elge-
sam, 2008; Halavais, 2010). Political economy scholars could argue that we are creating an 
intolerant society at the expense of the individual.
Conclusion
This article has provided an example of how media and communication studies can use 
media economics and management to identify differences in data strategies that, apart 
from the analytical value in itself, can enrich a detailed political economic discussion on 
profiling. The data point analysis shows significant differences despite the obvious simi-
larities between Google and Facebook as data companies. The key concepts that summa-





social network versus touch points, integrated versus diversified API structures, and repu-
tation versus relevance as guiding data strategic perspective.
Furthermore, the article suggests distinguishing between profiling for advertisers, third 
party companies or developers, and government agencies in order to encompass the soci-
etal implications of user profiling from a political economy perspective. The article argues 
that the data strategic differences pose different societal implications in the profiling for 
different stakeholders. Whereas, for instance, Facebook threatens individual privacy in 
exposure through friends, Google threatens privacy by individualizing non-individual ser-
vices. However, when it comes to government agencies, differences in data strategies play 
a minor role because in theory they can run algorithms on raw log-data across companies. 
The societal implications therefore become larger than the role of the specific data com-
pany. 
When we look at the conclusion of this article from a broader perspective, the differ-
ences in profiling and data strategies outlined here between the two most visited internet 
companies stress the importance of not generalizing on “big data” and profiling on the 
internet. Instead, we have to take into consideration the different versions and aspects of 
data strategies and profiling, for instance, in privacy discussions in order to address the 
complexity of profiling. Further work has to be done, among others, within media and com-
munication studies in order to improve our understanding of this complexity grounded in 
detailed analysis and in this connection we need to constantly improve our methods to 
provide a more solid empirical basis.
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